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MNIALICE IN MORALS AND IN LAW.
Malice in morals and malice in law are essentially distinct; yet
s knowledge of the nature and practical effects of the one will prove,
of singular service in the investigation of the other.
Malice (from Latin malitia, signifying wickedness, ill-will, spite,)'
is a special manifestation of malevolence, and is, therefore, a mental
condition requiring some exciting cause for its production. It is'
composed of two elements; the one negative, the other positive.
There is a negative of love, and there is, furthermore, present, positive ill-will, or design to compass the infliction of pain upon thedispleasing object. Lord Coke, in 2 Inst. 42, very properly distinguishes between hatred and malice, in that "malice is aeida, that
is, eager, sharp, cruel." Another passion, akin to malice, is anger,
which is "an uneasiness or discomposure of the mind upon the
receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge." Locke's,
Essays, b. 2, c. 20 § 12. Envy, also, is not unfrequently confounded with malice. The distinction between them will be perceived by adverting to the definition of the former : "Envy is an:
uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we
desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us."'
Ibid, § 13.
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Anger, envy, hatred, may, most generally do, coexist with malice,
but it is always as concomitants and not as elements. Such are
the results at which we arrive by introspection and observationthe only sources of psychological knowledge. They are important
in morals; for the moral quality neither does nor can abide in the
act. And, therefore, an eminent Jewish lawyer declares that " out
of the heart are the issues of life." Yet we, from finiteness of
understanding, are restricted, in our grounds of judgment, to overt
actions. The factlthat the common experience of mankind demonstrates an agreement between these and the prompting motive,
proves them no very inaccurate standard. The term overt actions,
as here used, comprehends a grouping of circumstances and relations
as well as of objects to be attained. Absolute correctness is not
to be expected, and little will be gained by giving to vague conceptions a "habitation and a name," without inquiring into their
character and application.
When we turn from morals to law, the field of vision is changed.
*The attention must be directed to the outer world, to actions in
their origin and results. Here a diligent collation of the authorities will afford us this comprehensive definition of malice: It is the
intentional doing of a wrongful act, with knowledge of its character,
and without just cause or excuse. State vs. York, 9 Metc. 104;
Wiggins vs. Coffin, 3 Story 7. The use of the word "intentional"
seemingly considers the mental state as still an element, but
it is in seeming only, for the word has a technical meaning distinct
from any reference to mind. The legal differs materially from the
moral import of malice. It signifies not merely hatred or ill-will,
but any wicked or mischievous intention of the mind, or inexcusable recklessness. Russell -on Cr. 483, n. i. This signification was
ignored by Pres. Nott, when he said, in speaking of the death of
Hamilton, "There may be murder in reason and in fact where there
is no malice." Many writers, literary and legal, have fallen into
the same error, which has tended to increase the confused ideas
-entertained upon the subject.
In this discussion we desire entirely to dissociate malice in intendment of law from the mental condition, with which, properly con-
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sidered, it has nothing to do, except in so far as the demonstrative
acts are found, on a posteriori principles, to be the natural outgrowth of such mental condition. With this understanding, we will
venture the following definition: Malice is the concurrence of certain circumstances, involving injury, actual or probable, to one
without adequate or justifiable benefit to another. Obviously, it
would be impossible to designate with greater precision, the indicia
of malice, for these vary with the phases of each particular case or
crime. There is sufficient definiteness for identification. The
injury, for instance, may be ideal or physical, according as it affects
character or person, or property; it may be present, or prospective; and it may be actual, or simply existent in the eye of the law.
The essential elements are the injury, as above explained, and the
deficiency of legal excuse, entirely excluding motive frbm the consideration. This is justified by the tendency of modern adjudication. Thus, in Wiggins vs. Coffin, before cited, Justice Story holds,
that "an act unlawful in itself and injurious to another is considered
both in law and reason, to be done with a malicious intent (malo
animo) against the party injured." The tendency is, also, shown
by the omission of the phrase "by the instigation of the devil," and
others of kindred import, from modern writs and pleadings.
KaNDs op MALIcE.-But malice, as thus far treated, is compound,
and, in practice, must be resolved into its elements. Generalmalice
is a love of evil for evil's sake. It proceeds from, and evidences
depravity of nature. There are sporadic exhibitions of it in all
countries, and sometimes there exist whole tribes or fraternities,
like the Thugs of India, actuated by such a disposition. From this,
particularmalice differs, in that it has .aspecific aim and object.
Another division is into constructive and actual, which are variously denominated implied and express, or malice in law and malice
infact. This distinction was first authoritatively made in the great
case of .Bromage vs. Prosser,4 B. & C. 247. After a verdict for
the defendant, upon a motion for a new trial, the Court of King's
Bench held that the law recognized the distinction between these
two descriptions of malice, to wit : malice in fact and malice in law.
And that malice, in common acceptation, meant ill-will against a
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person; but, in its legal sense, it meant a wrongful act done intentionally, without legal justification or excuse. Little improvement
has been made upon this statement. Like Lord Holt's opinibn in
the celebrated bailment case of Coggs vs. Bernard, it has, however, been elaborated and explained. We deduce the following
compact definitions from 2 Stark. Ev. 674-5: "Malice in law is a
mere inference of law, which results simply from a wilful transgression of law."
Malice in fact signifies "the actual state or condition of the mind
of the agent, with which he has done a particular act; as that he
did it with a view to prejudice a particular individual, either generally or in some specific manner."
Again: "A malicious intention in fact is a matter of inference from
all the circumstances of the particular case; but nevertheless the
terms, malice and malicious, being technical terms of law, involve, as
indeed all other technical terms do, the application of legal judgment and consideration to the facts as found by the jury."
It is noticeable that, although Mr. Starkie, following the popular
phraseology and style of thought, refers malice in fact to the internal
nature, yet he concludes by referring it simply and entirely to the
concurrence of specific facts, thus harmonizing with the definition
offered supra. See, also, T*rills vs. oToyes, 12 Pick. 828.
Malice prepense will require a brief notice in this connection. Sir
Edward Coke, in 3 Inst. 62, declares it existent, in the case of
felony, "where the act was done voluntarily, and of set purpose,
though done upon a sudden occasion." The element of time is
thus seen to be comparatively a non-essential. This kind is not
specially distinguishable from malice in fact.
MODE oi PRooi?.-To this, adversion has already been, and will
subsequently be made at some length. It constitutes, in part, the
difference between the several kinds of malice. Malice in law
results necessarily upon proof of the facts making up the cause of
action, or from evidence of gross negligence or carelessness. Malice
in fact must be directly proved by circumstances not intrinsic,
The stronger circumstances demonstrate, the
though relevant.
more clearly an evil motive as revealed in the adaptation of means
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to end. Malice is in all cases a question of fact to be determined
by the jury, under proper instructions from the court. But there
are cases where the jury may take it for granted, or, rather, where
its existence is a matter of no moment, except as an aggravating
circumstance.
MALICE AN ELEMENT OF LEGAL LIABILITY.-It is by some
denied that malice is ever an essential element of legal liability.
Such doctrine is hardly reconcilable with the language of the books
of earlier or later date. Its domain is more circumscribed than is
by many supposed; nevertheless it has a place in some actions as
an integral part of the offence charged, and evidence thereof must
be submitted to the jury. We shall follow the usual division of
actions.
I. Criminal actions.-1. Romicide.-" Though a man put
another to death; yet, according to the motive with which the act
was committed, the motive being to be determined by the circumstances of the particular case; what he has done, is, in law, justifiable, or excusable, or criminal." George on Libel, 150. We are
interested in only one of these kinds, to wit, felonious or criminal
homicide, which is defined by Blackstone (4 Com. 188) to be "the
killing of a human creature, of any age or sex, without justification
or excuse." This is itself divisible into manslaughter and murder.
Between these the main distinction is the presence or absence of
malice; for manslaughter, though unlawful, is a killing without
malice, express or implied. Chief Justice Shaw has, in State vs.
York, 9 Mete. 115, explained the principle here involved: "From
this view of the immemorial usage of the courts, upon special verdicts, it appears manifest that the fact of the killing is primafacie
evidence of malice, and, unless overcome by preponderating proof
the other way, it must be held murder, and judgment given accordingly." This is merely a restatement of the doctrine laid downby
Blackstone in his Commentaries. We do not understand it to be
essentially changed in New York by the decision of the court of
Appeals in the McCann case. That decision-which seems to be
contrary to all law, whatever may be its foundation in common
sense-enforces the onus probandi upon the prosecution to an
unheard of extent. The question of malice must, however, remain
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as heretofore. If the defence disprove the presumption, positive
proof of express malice must be adduced by the prosecution. This
consists of "external circumstances discovering the inward intention; as laying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and
concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm." 4 Bi. Com.
199.
2. Mayh~em.-This, in order to be felony, must be done with
malice prepense. The same principles apply to it as to murder.
3. Arson.-This is the malicious and wilful burning the house or
outhouse of another man. 4 Bi. Com. 219. It may be committed
by setting fire to one's own property. The presumption here,
also, is against the defendant; but, upon its rebutter, positive proof
must be given, as in the two preceding cases, which proof arises
from the precedent and contemporary circumstances.
4. .MaiciousMischief.-" In its general application, it may be
defined to be any malicious or mischievous injury, either to the
rights of another, or to those of the public in general." Whart.
Am. Cr. Law, 433, 1st ed. Malice, either express or implied,
against the owner, and not against the thing injured, is requisite
to the maintenance of the action. State vs. 'ilcox, 8 Yerg. 278.
5. Iibel.-"A libel is a censorious or ridiculous writing, picture
or sign, made with a mischievous and malicious intent towards government, magistrates or individuals." Hamilton arguendo, -People vs. Jrosswell, 8 Johns. Cas. 854.
In ordur to constitute this an indictable offence, it must be shown
to have been written or published with malice. 8 Chitty's Cr.
Law, 867. The malice results as a necessary implication upon
proof of the libel. It may be rebutted by the defendant in two
ways: 1st. By showing that the publication was made by an agent,
without his knowledge or authority; 2d. By showing the truth of
the charge, and that the publication was made with good motives
and for justifiable ends. At common law the truth was no defence.
II. Civil Actions.-Some actions may, at the same time, be prosecuted criminally on behalf of the public for the penalty, and
civilly by the individual for damages. The general procedure is
for the courts, upon granting the indictment, to require the indi-
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vidual to forego his civil action; or, if this is not done, for the jury
to modify their verdict by reference to the action to which the
defendant is still liable. Only one of these will need additional
consideration.
1. Malicious Proseoution.-Two things are necessary to sustain
an action of this sort, to wit: want of probable cause for the prosecution by the defendant; and maliciousness in the prosecution.
-Ewing vs. Sandford, 21 Ala. 162. Some of the authorities are
more liberal, but as the doctrine has been recognized in the federal
courts, it may be regarded as well settled. Justice Story says, in
'Wiggins vs. Coffin, ut supra: "1In respect to the other point,
whether the prosecution was malicious, as well as without probable
cause, (for both must concur to support the action), malice may be
justly deduced from the total want of probable cause; for, in the
sense of the law, that is a malicious act which is done wilfully by a
party against his own sense of duty and right."
2. Libel.-This has previously been defined. To it the doctrine
of malice is applicable in all its fullness and under all its various
phases. Ordinarily, proof of the writing and publication draws in its
train the presumption of malice. A justification attempted, but
not most precisely proved, is, at common law, conclusive evidence
of malice. Boot vs. King, 7 Cowen, 624. This rule is modified
in the State of lNew York, by the construction given to § 185 of
the code of procedure by the Court of Appeals, in Bush vs. Prosser, 1 Kern. 347. Proof of the falsity of the charge involves
malice.
But there is a class of cases in which it must be specifically
proved. These may be denominated,, in general terms, cases of
privilege. Such are the character given to a servant; remarks
made in a legislative assembly, in the course of judicial proceedings,
or in church discipline; and others of the like nature. Where, as
in these cases, an evil motive is an essential, substantive part of the
offence, it is to be determined by "a consideration, in every particular case, of all such circumstances as may, in right season-in
the judgment of plain, unsophisticated common sense-be thought
to make either for or against the fact of an evil motive having led

